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CAVEAT EMPTOR VERSUS CAVEAT VENDITOR
By CHARLEs T. LEVIN-_ss*
Federal statutes and court decisions of the past decade
have tightened the hold of government over business, both
big and little. There is scarcely a trade or exchange, a
barter or sale, that is not now affected by that big stick
of federal control called regulation of interstate commerce.
As parens patriae, Uncle Sam stands today as traffic cop
in the channels of commerce, not only hustling on the
traffic but filtering it through a maze of federal regulations
to make it pure and sweet, clean and truthful.
The modern buyer need not be too wary. He may rely
on newspaper advertisements and on labels describing his
prospective purchase. A host of agencies protect him and
are vigilant in his interest. These range from the strong
arm of the Federal Trade Commission to state statutes
and unofficial bodies such as Better Business Bureaus.
As a principle of legal relationship between buyer and
seller, caveat emptor is today a pretty sick horse. It is
not so much the buyer as it is the manufacturer and the
merchant who must beware, on penalty of fine or imprison-
ment. The rise and the fall of this Latin phrase, which
has attained the status of an ancient maxim, makes good
copy. To begin with, it is not very ancient. It goes back
only to about the time of Coke, and marks a new individ-
uality of thought and custom current in his time and found
in the frontier days of our own country.
Caveat emptor was always popular in America. It pos-
sessed a certain ruggedness that we as a young nation
* Of the Baltimore City Bar. A.B., 1923, Princeton University; LL.B.,
1926, University of Maryland. Assistant Attorney General of Maryland,
1935-1939.
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liked to associate with ourselves. It was found in a few
English decisions prior to the Revolutionary War. It was
not a legal principle of the Middle Ages, nor is it found
in the Roman Law, despite its Latin expression.
As a matter of fact, the Middle Ages treated the buyer
with much the same deference he finds today in the phrase
"the customer is always right". In feudal times there was
no freedom of trade at all. Society was based on a system
of rigid controls, authority being divided between church
and lords. This regimentation extended to and enveloped
trade practises.
The main purpose of early trade control seems to have
been to insure an open market, a fair price, an honest
measure and a good quality, considerations which might
be termed ideal in any age but always difficult of attain-
ment. But if our best efforts today are not good enough
to prevent some abuses, let our current administrators take
heart from the experiences of their predecessors half a
dozen centuries back.
The first legally recognized program of regulation of
trade appears to have been the assizes of bread and of
beer, in the reign of King John about 1256.1 As between
the two, it appears that the brewers were more often haled
into court than the bakers. The principal charge seems
to have been the dispensing of bad beer or the use of
scant measures.
But there were others who also got in trouble with
the authorities. For instance, the early records show com-
plaints that the men of Sprouston buy measly pigs and
sell sausages and puddings unfit for human bodies; that
one John Truckke bought a drowned cow and sold it in
little pieces; that the cooks and pastry-makers of the town
warm up pastries and meats on the second and third day;
and that William Brok, butcher, sold meat of oxen and
sheep, measly bad and putrid through age.2 The penalty
usually was to make good the loss, but occasionally a
I Selden Society, Select Pleas in Manorial and other Seignorial Courts
(Maitland Edition, 1889).
1 Selden Society, Leet Jurisdiction in Norwich (Hudson Edition, 1892) 8,
10, 13, 47, 60, 71, 80.
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flagrant violator or a repeater would be made to ride
a rail through the town square.
Elaborate regulations were devised by our ancestors
to control trade practises at fairs. Goods were to be sold
only in shops which had frontage. No merchandise could
be sold which was not publicly exhibited to all. Inspectors
of weights and measures were appointed. The office of
the alnager was established, and it was his duty to meas-
ure cloth. Canvas and woolen goods could not be sold
in the same store because such a dual display might con-
fuse the purchaser or tempt the merchant to pass off cotton
for wool.3
The ambulatory fair was succeeded in popularity by
the market town or central place to which would-be pur-
chasers might travel in order to obtain a wider selection.
This practise developed along with transportation and, by
the Fifteenth Century, London already had become the
chief market town of the island. An elaborate body of
law sprang up to regulate trade in the market towns, of
which the keystone was the doctrine of the open market.
Most any sale was good if made in "market overt". A sale
made in open market carried a warranty of title which
did not exist if the sale were made in the back of a store,
in an alley, or in the purchaser's private home.'
Salesmen were required to keep away from hotels and
private houses unless sent for by a lord or baron. Sales
could not be made by candlelight, in the dark part of a
store, or after sunset. Even in taverns, there was a rule
that travelers dropping in to quench their thirst must pro-
ceed first to the cellars to see that the beer they were to
drink came from the proper casks.5
While modern regulation of the ancient art of beer-
drinking has not yet imposed such a requirement upon
the thirsting wayfarer, at least one alcoholic beverage-
3 Selden Society, Select Cases on the Law Merchant, Vol. 1, (Gross Edi-
tion, 1908) 2, 14, 15, 24, 37, 40, 41, 43, 56, 58.
4 Pease Market Overt in the City of London (1915) 31 L. Q. Rev. 270.
5 Memorials of London in the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Cen-
turies (Riley Edition, 1868) 81-3, 181, 2134, 318-9, 415; (1931) 40 Y. L. J.
1148.
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control board has a rule requiring each beer tap to be
conspicuously labeled and requiring such tap to be con-
nected directly with the beer keg containing the product
advertised on the tap. Tavern-keepers found passing off
ten cent beer for the fifteen cent variety advertised on
the beer tap face suspension of licenses.
6
Manufacturers in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Cen-
turies also were subjected to regulation in the public inter-
est. For instance, bakers were forbidden to make loaves
false either as to the dough or the weight. Weavers could
not set their threads too far apart or turn out cloth worse
in the middle than at the sides. Skinners were prohibited
from furbishing up worn furs otherwise than with the
lines and collars of the old garments attached. Chandlers
could not put resin in wax tapers. No tanner might use
false leather disloyally tanned or curried. Potters were
enjoined from making utensils which when put upon the
fire would "come to nothing and melt." Coopers were
forbidden to construct casks for ale and beer out of second-
hand wood lest the savor of the liquor be spoiled. Casket-
makers were forbidden to make their boxes of false and
rotten wood covered over with linen cloth.7
From the variety of rules governing open markets, it
could be inferred that the science of salesmanship early
reached a high peak. For instance, there was an ordinance
forbidding merchants to set up red and black cloths or
felts whereby the eyes of the buyers were deceived in
the choice of a good clothA Another outlawed night work
for founders and other workers in metal because it gave
opportunity to introduce false iron for tin and to gild false
copper. In 1365 every manufacturer was required to adopt
a seal so that his goods might be known and recognized
afar. The baker had to put his mark upon his bread, the
weaver upon his cloths.0
0 Rule 21, Rules and Regulations, Board of Liquor License Commissioners
of Baltimore City (1941 Ed.).
7 Memorials of London, 8upra, n. 5, 118, 563.
Bland, Brown and Tawney, English Economic History (1920) 155.
§ Memorials of London, supra, n. 5, 226, 512.
"0 Ibid, 358.
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There was rigid price control during this period and
the seller departed from the lawful rate at his peril. It
seems that all the material and spiritual necessities of
life were governed by standardized prices. 0. P. A. has
not yet even dreamed of anything like this; let us hope
it does not read this article. For in the old days almost
every article of commerce, every service had its ceiling
price. Even prayers had their price tag. The saying of
a mass cost one farthing. The law provided, moreover,
that if a half-penny were extended in payment for the
mass and the proper change were not forthcoming, the
worshiper was to have his prayer for nothing" But bap-
tisms and marriages were not on the price chart. Pre-
sumably they brought what the traffic would bear.
The anxious solicitude of the law for the rights of
customers was sometimes used as a cloak by craftsmen
to keep outsiders from entering their trades, augmenting
their numbers, and thus reducing the exploitable business
of the community. For instance, if there were six plumb-
ers in a town and another one attempted to move in,
the six would try to exclude him on the theory that he
was unskilled and should not be allowed to foist himself
upon the unsuspecting townspeople. Machinery was pro-
hibited in the mills, for the ostensible reason that work
done by the hands of men insured a higher quality product.
Today, we have in this State boards regulating the trade
of plumbers, barbers, hairdressers, horseshoers and many
others whose ostensible function is to examine candidates
for the trade. The fact that few such candidates pass
their examination is due, they will tell you, to a deep
solicitude for the public welfare and not at all to a hope
of keeping down their own numbers.
As more and more laws were passed to regulate trade,
so more and more violations were noted. (There is a
moral here but let us not pause to expound it). Punish-
ment was in store for the felon who put a bushel of good
oats at the mouth of the sack when the rest was of worse
quality, a trick that one would think even the innocents
I' IbidZ, 463.
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of the Fourteenth Century would be on to. There are
cases involving deceptive trade practises such as "selling
false bow strings, barrels wanting in their true measure
by two gallons, cups bound with silver gilt, false counters
of gold, small bags filled with other merchandise than
good powder ginger." An indictment of an early faith-
healer is noted. Because his charm for fever and ailments
was a leaf of parchment wrapped up in cloth of gold, he
was mounted on a horse and led through the city with
trumpets and pipes, with a whetstone about his neck, and
urinals hung about him fore and aft.12
Abuses of trade regulations became so wide-spread in
England that the people gradually revolted against the
rules and decided that it might be better to let each cus-
tomer shift for himself. The reason for the downfall of
the elaborate system built up in the Fourteenth, Fifteenth
and Sixteenth Centuries seems to have been primarily a
complete breakdown in administrative energy and integ-
rity, comparable somewhat to our experience with the
Prohibition Amendment. By the Seventeenth Century,
there was general complaint of intolerable abuse and fraud
in the application of these regulations.
It was this popular frame of mind which developed
the adage, "Let the buyer beware," embalmed by the writ-
ers in the Latin caveat emptor. The first time that this
phrase appeared in print seems to have been in 1534, and
it related to horse trading. Wrote Fitzherbert in his Boke
of Husbandrie: "If he be tame and have ben rydden upon,
then caveat emptor." The phrase was taken up by the
text writers, popularized by Coke and Blackstone, and
preached as gospel by early American appellate jurists.
The ideology of caveat emptor was popular with the
common folk. It denoted to them that they could stand
their own ground with the tricks of the merchants. They
scorned the proffered aid of the jobholders appointed for
their protection, since they found that many could not
be trusted. They became sharp and suspicious traders
themselves and demanded proof of the asseverations of
1 Ibid, 464, 466.
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the merchants. They justified their new-found doctrine
by the elemental formula of Christian marriages, that par-
ties must accept each other for better or for worse. When
a man took himself a wife, whether the price was a mug
of beer or a lusty sum in gold, it was understood that
he also took his chance upon latent defects in the chattel.13
From horse-trading and the marriage mart, the doc-
trine of caveat emptor quickly spread to other fields. A
case before King's Bench, in the matter of one Chandelor,
gave it prestige, if not definition and legal effect.
14
But the doctrine was more than a mere rule of trade.
It became also a rule of personal conduct and of political
thought. Let each man be strong and keen, capable of
taking care of himself. With the advent of the Eighteenth
Century the spirit of individualism was intense and there
was a growing trend to laissez-faire. The great Black-
stone, whose writings so influenced the circuit riders in
young America, provided an out for the merchant "against
defects that are plainly and obviously the object of one's
senses," and attributed liability to the seller only for a
"defect that cannot be discovered by sight and is a matter
of skill or collateral proof."' 5
Statement of the doctrine of caveat emptor, as limited
and qualified by the writers, was fairly simple. Its appli-
cation was no such picnic. For instance, in 1778 a seller
warranted that a mare was sound. He was held to be
accountable to the purchaser because of the latent defect
of windgals.16
On the other hand, a man who bought two pictures
by an obscure artist believing them to be works of a
master was thrown out of court, it being held that the
name of the painter set down in the catalog represented
no more than the opinion of the dealer. 7
I Kenny, Wife-Selling in England (1929) 45 L. Q. Rev. 494.
11 Chandelor v. Lopus, Cr. Jac. 4, 79 Eng. Rep. 3 (1603). Also see Park-
inson v. Lee, 2 East 314, 102 Eng. Rep. 389 (1802), the "hops" case.
15 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (American Ed.,
1772) 165-166.
's Stuart v. Wilkins, 1 Doug. 19, 99 Eng. Rep. 15 (1778).
17 Jendwine v. Slade, 2 Esp. 572 (1797).
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In this country the doctrine of caveat emptor achieved
its real triumph during the Nineteenth Century. The
growth of the railroad, the Westward Ho' movement, and
the emergence of our infant industrial system influenced
the courts to extol individualism in business, as in private
life.
Caveat emptor not only was a sound legal precept, it
was the patriotic thing. How could a man shift for him-
self on the frontier unless he could survive in the marts
of commerce? As one jurist said in 1804: "The doctrine
of caveat emptor is best calculated to excite that caution
and attention which all prudent men ought to observe in
making their contracts.' 8
Throughout the Nineteenth Century the maxim was
firmly entrenched as controlling in American jurispru-
dence. A statement of the United States Supreme Court,
rendered just after the Civil War, was typical of the period.
It held caveat emptor to be of such universal acceptance
that "such a rule, requiring the purchaser to take care
of his own interests, has been found best adapted to the
wants of trade in the business transactions of life."'19
But this hardy doctrine clashed with the developing
ideas of a planned and ordered society. One writer of
the maxim's decline draws the conclusion that "A refined
caveat emptor still means that purchase is a game of
chance."20 Soon after the turn of the century a movement
arose to take the gamble out of shopping. This trend is
still upon us.
The proponents of clean advertising and honest labeling
followed the lead of most other reform groups of the
period and proceeded on two fronts, the state legislatures
and the federal congress. The fight in the states resulted
in the passage of false advertising statutes in 42 states. The
compaign in Congress labored and brought forth the Fed-
eral Trade Commission.
" Seixas and Seixas v. Woods, 2 Caine R. 48, 54 (N. Y., 1804)
"1 Barnard v. Kellogg, 77 U. S. 383, 388 (1870).
20 Hamilton, The Ancient Maoim Caveat Emptor (1931) 40 Y. L. J. 1133,
1187.
[VOL. VII
CAVEAT EMPTOR
The battle in the states deserves passing comment. The
movement for a model state statute against false adver-
tising was launched in 1911 by Printers' Ink, a trade jour-
nal. At the outset it recognized the enforcement problem
and said: "We are against any law unless, at the same
time, it is made somebody's business to watch out for in-
fractions of the law, to collect the evidence, and see that
the case is pressed. '21
Thereupon interested volunteer organizations sprang
forward to push the bill and enforce the finished product,
if and when. Among these was the National Vigilance
Committee of the Associated Advertising Clubs; and later
came the Better Business Bureaus, which have given the
statute strength, virility and vigorous prosecution. Shorn
of extra verbiage, the Printers' Ink model statute states
that "Any person who, with intent to sell, disseminates
an advertisement which contains any assertion, representa-
tion or statement of fact which is untrue, deceptive or mis-
leading, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
The statute did not require proof of scienter, it will
be noted. When the solons of the Maryland General As-
sembly were confronted with this bill, and also with the
pressure which accompanied it, their reaction was char-
acteristic: they compromised. The Maryland statute,
passed in 1914, requires proof of guilty knowledge. It is
hard to prove that an advertiser knew his statements were
false. Thus our law is said to lack teeth. Efforts have
been made in subsequent sessions to provide the necessary
molars, without success thus far.
Twenty-four states have adopted the model statute;
eighteen, including Maryland, have a weakened form of
the model requiring proof of knowledge of the falsity
of the advertisement or other such safeguards of the ad-
vertiser. Six states have no such law.22
21135 Printers' Ink, 160 (Apr. 22, 1926). Also see issue of May 31, 1940.
22 In 1911 Printers' Ink launched its campaign for state statutes against
false advertising. It produced a model statute, written by Harry D. Nims
of the New York City Bar, which is here quoted:
"Any person, firm, corporation or association who, with Intent to
sell or in any wise dispose of merchandise, securities, service, or
anything offered by such person, firm, corporation or association,
directly or indirectly, to the public for sale or distribution, or with
1943]
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None of the state statutes has been conspicuously suc-
cessful in cleaning up advertising, due to lack of enforce-
ment machinery, uninterested prosecutors, and other fac-
intent to increase the consumption thereof, or to induce the public
In any manner to enter into any obligation relating thereto, or to
acquire title thereto, or an interest therein, makes, publishes, dis-
seminates, circulates, or places before the public, or causes, directly
or indirectly, to be made, published, disseminated, circulated, or
placed before the public, in this State, in a newspaper or other publi-
cation, or in the form of a book, notice, handbill, poster, bill, circular,
pamphlet, or letter, or in any other way, an advertisement of any sort
regarding merchandise, securities, service, or anything so offered to
the public, which advertisement contains any assertion, representa-
tion or statement of fact which is untrue, deceptive or misleading,
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
Thereafter an attempt was made to have it enacted in every State Legis-
lature. The fight was waged by advertising groups throughout the nation,
participated in by the Associated Advertising Clubs of the World and later
by the Better Business Bureaus.
As a part of the movement to secure clean advertising and appropriate
legislation, the Associated Advertising Clubs at their Boston convention in
1911 adopted the "Truth in Advertising" motto and two years later at the
Baltimore convention drew up their "Declaration of Principles" which
today guides and controls the policies of all Better Business Bureaus. The
clubs lined up actively behind the model statute.
It will be noted that the statute makes mere publication of the untrue
statement a violation of law. No scienter is required, or proof that the
advertiser knew, or should have known, or might by reasonably diligent
investigation have discovered, that the misstatement is not "the truth, the
whole truth and nothing but the truth." Therein lies the strength and
effectiveness of the statute, from the prosecutor's view point; and therein
lies the antipathy to it on the part of many advertisers who ask how they
are supposed to be omniscient about all phases of all goods they are called
upon to advertise and sell.
Despite these objections to the model act, the pressure put behind it
caused enactment in toto, or substantially so, in the District of Columbia
and twenty-five states, as follows: Alabama, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mis-
souri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin and
Wyoming.
Seventeen other states to which the model statute was presented amended
versions of it, the amendments consisting chiefly of the addition of safe-
guards designed to protect the unwitting advertiser from being punished
for misstatements inadvertently made. The difficulty of proof under the
amended or limited statutes is obvious. How can it be determined whether
the advertiser was honestly mistaken, or whether he was trying a little
light and fancy chiseling? Most of the states which have passed limited
versions of the model have added the word "knowingly", thus forcing the
prosecutor to prove knowledge of the misstatement. Printers' Ink has
always fought such attempts to scuttle the act. It calls the word "know-
ingly" the "joker" in the pack and states that it "seriously weakens the
model statute." See Printers' Ink, May 31, 1940.
The seventeen states which have such a limited act are as follows: Ari-
zona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Maryland, Montana, Massachusetts,
North Carolina, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont and West Virginia.
Six states have neither model statute nor bastardized verson thereof, as
follows: Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Maine, Mississippi, New Mexico.
But in Delaware the City of Wilmington has a local ordinance modeled
on the Printers' Ink statute.
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tors. Their role has been in the local field only, as an
adjunct to the work of the Federal Trade Commission,
whose work we shall now consider.
It is said that ninety-three per cent. of our population is protected by
these acts. For able articles on the subject see (1926) 36 Y. L. J. 1155;
and (1931) 31 Col. L. R. 527.
THE MARYLAND STATUTES. In this State there are two statutes, both
being modifications of the Printers' Ink model. In 1914 the Legislature,
confronted with the model bill, added the words "wilfully and knowingly"
before the words "makes or disseminates" any false statement. Md. Laws
1914, Ch. 410, Md. Code (1939) Art. 27, Sec. 208.
Six years later, when another attempt was made to secure the model
statute, the Legislature adopted the exact wording of the act but added
the saving clause that the untrue statement must be known to be false or
one which "by the exercise of reasonable care should be known by such
person to be untrue." Md. Laws 1920, Ch. 704, Md. Code (1939) Art. 27,
Sec. 209 (1939 Edition). The 1914 Act was not repealed.
So now we have both of them, neither of which is entirely effective.
Prosecutions are generally under the later statute.
The City of Baltimore also has a "Seconds Law," an ordinance regulating
the advertisement and sale of second-hand, rejected, "seconds," "irregular,"
blemished or defective merchandise. Ordinance No. 30, City of Baltimore,
July 21, 1931.
Because of the practical difficulties of proof, the advertising statute has
not been frequently invoked in Baltimore and there is no record that it
has ever been proceeded under in the counties of Maryland. The State's
Attorney's office in Baltimore refers to it as "the Better Business Bureau
statute" and all of the cases instituted in Baltimore have been on informa-
tion furnished by the local Bureau.
Indeed, that was the idea when the model statute was drafted. Many
Bureaus were organized for the express purpose of establishing "truth in
advertising" and enforcing this act. However, in at least two states, paid
official investigators enforce the act. In 1926 Wisconsin hired two special
officers for this purpose. See Printers' Ink, April 22, 1926. In Minnesota
the law is enforced by deputies of the Department of Agriculture, Dairy
and Food.
Prosecutions in Maryland and their results follow:
CRIMINAL COURT OF BALTIMORE. Indictment No. 1054, 1927. A depart-
ment store was brought to court for falsely advertising fire sale when the
evidence showed the goods being sold were never in the building at the
time of the fire. The verdict of guilty was given but the case was adjusted
in cooperation with counsel for the Better Business Bureau on agreement
that sufficient correction be offered in the newspapers repudiating the
advertising.
Indictment Nos. 4479 to 4488, 1927. This concern was charged with
selling seconds and blemished merchandise and failing to qualify adver-
tising under the city ordinance. When the case came up the company
demurred to the indictment because of faulty titling of the ordinance and
the demurrer was sustained. At the request of the Better Business
Bureau the City Council re-titled the ordinance as it stands today.
Indictments Nos. 1515 and 1516, November, 1931. Judge O'Dunne fined
the proprietor of a photographic studio $100 for false advertising in con-
nection with photographic coupons sold to the public.
Indictment No. 1633, 1933. Two persons were indicted for false adver-
tising in connection with certificates for free permanent waves. Records
show that a detainer was placed on one of them in another city, but the
case was not tried.
Indictment No. 1686, June, 1933. Defendant was indicted and tried
before Judge Stanton for advertising in the classified sections of the Balti-
more Sun for teachers to enroll for better positions with his organization,
which, through the evidence submitted, did not exist. He was sentenced
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Undeniably the Commission first saw the light of day
in Congress as a trust-busting measure. Its usefulness
in regulating interstate advertising and deceptive trade
practises was, at best, a second thought. Judges" who
in later years pointed out this fact have been criticized
by the law review writers24 but their logic is based on
the simple history of the statute. The origin of the com-
mission was the result of a popular reaction against the
to six months, but it was suspended on agreement that he would leave the
State.
Indictment No. 650, February, 1934. The proprietor of a cut-rate store
advertised Virginia Dare wine and sold a product known as White Doe
wine made by the Virginia Dare Extract Company. On plea of his attor-
ney that he thought he was within his rights in selling it as a Virginia
Dare wine in view of the fact that the makers were the Virginia Dare
Extract Co., he obtained a not guilty verdict.
Indictment No. 1291, April, 1936. The defendant was round guilty and
paid a fine of $100.
Indictment No. 2099, 1936. Defendant was charged with advertising by
misnaming the material content of dresses and advertising merchandise
that was sub-standard and blemished without so declaring in the adver-
tising. This case was set for trial December 16, 1936, but was settled by
counsel and the case was stetted on agreement.
Indictment No. 3569, 1936. A theatre was charged that, after adver-
tising that Major Bowes and Jack Benny's amateurs were to appear on
the stage, the evidence showed that those who did appear were never with
Bowes. The defendant pleaded guilty and was fined $25 and costs by
Judge Albert S. J. Owens.
POLICE MAGISTRATES' CASES. Magistrate itanft (1929). Advertising
sign in window misleading as to price of merchandise, large 250 sign-
small "on the dollar." Ordered removal within two hours.
October, 1931, N. W. Police Court. Classified ad for sale of furniture,
alleged to be her household equipment. Proved she was substituting fac-
tory shipments. Held for court, $500 bail. Adjusted before magistrate
and dismissed at request of the Better Business Bureau.
Held for grand jury on $500 bail. Adjusted before further action.
Eastern District (1935).
Continuation of "Last day-going out or Dusiness" signs. Ordered to
remove signs by court. Central District (1935).
Going out of business. Charges were that stock had been nought and
was being sold by purchaser, so was already "Out of business". Court
ordered signs removed. Central District, 1936.
Classified mover's ad, "3 rooms $4.00, 6 rooms $7.00." Continued to
charge other prices. Magistrate Fine, N. W. District, ordered him to
change advertising copy (1936).
No case involving these statutes has been nefore the Maryland Court of
Appeals.
For a listing of the State statutes, a cross-section summary of the prose-
cutions under each reported by local Better Business Bureaus, and all
court constructions of such statutes, see pamphlet entitled "The Law of
False Advertising," by the writer of this article, printed in July, 1942, by
The Daily Record Co., Baltimore, and distributed privately by The Better
Business Bureau of Baltimore.
11 L. B. Silver Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 292 F. 752 (C. C. A. 6th,
1923).
" Handler, The Jurisdiction of the Federal Traae Commission Over False
Advertising (1931) 31 Col. L. R. 527, 549.
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growing power of the large and expanding business insti-
tutions in this country which became known, in the par-
lance of the stump speakers, as monopolies.
As far back as 1890, the Sherman Anti-trust Act" had
been enacted by Congress to put down a wave of combina-
tions in the railroad and other industrial realms. Enforce-
ment of the Sherman Act, viewed in retrospect, must be
branded as a complete failure. Combinations of corpora-
tions continued to be formed. Indeed, there was much
to be said in the public interest for the development of
large railroad lines under single control, rather than the
series of jerkwater lines which the policy of the Sherman
Act seemed to encourage. However, the people, as opposed
to the "interests", saw in the growth of these combinations
a real or potential threat to their liberties. Small business
saw itself frozen out by big business. The politicians lent
a friendly ear to this clamor. In 1903, Roosevelt I, who
was something of a liberal in his own right, established
a Bureau of Corporations which he attached to the De-
partment of Commerce and Labor. The apparent object
of this new Bureau was to investigate the organization
and conduct of corporations and combinations engaged in
interstate commerce, except common carriers, and to re-
port its findings to the President, who in turn would make
recommendations to Congress. It was thought that the
publicity resulting from these governmental investigations
of business would discourage the forming of combinations
in restraint of trade. This device fell far short of its
announced purpose.
In 1911, in the famous Standard Oil case,26 the Supreme
Court applied what it called a "rule of reason" to large
corporate combinations, although upholding a dissolution
of the oil group. This decision so frightened the trust-
busting fraternity that a well-organized campaign was
launched. "Little business" and consumer elements joined
hands. Both the Democratic and Republican parties, in
their campaigns of 1912, adopted planks in their platforms
25 Adopted July 2, 1890; U. S. C. A. Title 15, Secs. 1-7.20 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1 (1910).
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calling for reform legislation and opposing the extending
tentacles of corporate interests.
The Democratic candidate that year, Governor Wilson
of New Jersey, was himself an old hand at championing
the rights of the little fellow against the encroachments of
monopolistic interests. Back in 1898, when a professor
at Princeton, he had published a textbook called "The
State". This had discussed the capitalistic system under
a democracy and the part that free trade and open compe-
tition should play under our form of government. Thus
he was able in the 1912 campaign to elucidate his doctrines
without benefit of ghost writers."
Upon election, President Wilson met the issue with two
measures: (1) a strengthening of the anti-trust laws which
became known as the Clayton Act,28 intended to supple-
ment the Sherman Act by declaring certain specific prac-
tises illegal and (2) creation of the Federal Trade Com-
mission with the dual mission of investigating combina-
tions in restraint of trade and of blocking, in the language
of the Act, "unfair methods of competition in commerce."
In addition, the Federal Trade Commission was given the
power to administer the Sherman Act, designed to break
up combinations in restraint of trade.29
There is nothing in the background or origin of the
Commission to indicate that its sponsors expected it to
have any special control over advertising. Its birth-marks
were all those of anti-trust and monopoly. Yet almost
from its inception the Commission has devoted its major
efforts to the advertising field.
Certainly the need was there, if not the specific author-
ity. Patent medicine advertising was the curse of the day.
It is doubtful that people were killed, or even made worse,
by drinking the stuff. But a campaign developed and
gathered momentum. A United States Senator declared
of patent medicine vendors: "They are the people who
for the sake of a few dirty dollars are willing to imperil
27 Woodrow Wilson, The New Democracy.
2"Adopted October 15, 1914; U. S. C. A., Title 15, Sees. 12-27.
2- Adopted September 26, 1914; amended by Wheeler-Lea Act, March 21,
1938; U. S. C. A., Title 15, Secs. 41-77. See 79 A. L. R. 1200 (1932).
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the comfort, the wealth and the lives of millions of people
who cannot protect themselves."" ° It was pointed out that
the very words "patent medicine" were fraudulent because
of thousands of remedies not more than half a dozen were
actually patented. 1
The Commission jumped whole-hog into cleaning up
patent-medicine advertising, as well as other fields.
Strangely, most all of its complaints originated, not with
its own staff or with the public, but with competitors. It
has been estimated that from the beginning up to the
present time, practically ninety-five per cent of all com-
plaints lodged with the Commission have been initiated
by one competitor against another.3 2
Misleading and deceptive advertising has consumed the
time and energies of the Commission almost to the com-
plete exclusion of its original assignment of trust-busting,
as well as its other activities. This is not a recent trend
but has been chronic from the first. Although charged
with the administration of anti-trust legislation under the
Sherman and Clayton Acts and with the administration
of the Miller-Tydings, Robinson-Patman and Webb-Pom-
erene Acts, sixty-five per-cent of its complaints during one
typical year dealt with deceptive advertising. Of a total
of 370 complaints issued, 241 charged misleading advertis-
30 Senator McCumber, 40 Cong. Rec. Part 3, p. 2653 (1906).
8 "In the field of medicine, human credulity learns little from experi-
ence", wrote Dr. Cramp. "In the purchase of any kind of merchandise,
except that sold for the alleged alleviation or cure of disease, the buyer
has a chance of learning eventually whether or not he has been swindled.
In the purchase of an automobile, a piano, or a suit of clothes, time will
prove whether it was a good or a bad bargain; nature, through its agencies
of wear and tear, makes clear whether one has been cheated. But when
we go into the market to buy medicament or medical service, we are at
sea, for here we have nature not as an assistant to aid our judgment but
as an opponent to confuse it. In from 80 per cent. to 85 per cent. of all
cases of human ailments, it is probable that the individual will get well
whether he does something for his indisposition or does nothing for it. The
healing power of nature-vi8 medicatric naturae-fortunately for biologic
perpetuity, works that way. The seller of medicaments, then, obviously
starts with at least an eighty per cent. chance in his favor. The pills and
panaceas of today are colloquially, but incorrectly, called 'patent medi-
cines'; incorrectly, because among the thousands of remedies offered to
the public for the self-treatment of disease there are probably not half a
dozen that are really patented." Nostrums and Quackery and Pseudo-
Medicine, by Arthur J. Cramp, 3rd Ed., Intro. p. VII; 103 F. (2) 538
(1939).
32 (1940) 8 Geo. Wash. L. R. 249, 262.
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ing, 125 of which involved foods, drugs, devices or cos-
metics. Of 600 stipulations accepted, 329 were concerned
with the same charge."
The reasons for the Commission's heavy list to the ad-
vertising side appear to have been two-fold: (1) a per-
sonal or political desire on the part of the early commis-
sioners to clean up this field, impelled by public clamor
in the patent medicine and other groups and (2) friendly
court decisions. It will be recalled that the original Act
gave the Commission jurisdiction only over "unfair meth-
ods of competition in commerce." It was not until 1938,
with the adoption of the Wheeler-Lea Act,34 that Congress
added the words "and unfair or deceptive acts or practises
in commerce." Thus for the first twenty-three years of
its life the Commission, in cracking down on phoney ad-
vertisements, was under the statutory compulsion of show-
ing that some competitor was being injured thereby.
The courts were lenient with the Commission in the
great majority of cases and read broadly into or around
this statutory language. The first real court test of the
powers of the Commission came in 1919 in the Sears Roe-
buck case and resulted in a victory for the Commission's
exercise of its powers. Holding that the Commission rep-
resented the government as parens patriae, it ruled that it
was not necessary for the commissioners to prove that any
competitor had been damaged or that any purchaser had
been deceived. They are to "exercise their common sense
as informed by their knowledge of the general idea of unfair
trade at common law," the Court said, adding "and thus to
stop all those trade practises that have a capacity or a
tendency to injure competitors directly or through decep-
tion of purchasers." 5
33 Annual Report, Federal Trade Comm. (1939); (1940) 53 Harvard
L. R. 828, 834-5.
34 Supra, n. 29.
-5 Sears Roebuck and Company v. Federal Trade Commission, 258 F. 307
(C. C. A. 7th, 1919). Another early case which gave the Commission a good
start in its campaign was Federal Trade Commission v. Winsted Hosiery
Co., 258 U. S. 483 (1922). There the Supreme Court, speaking through
Mr. Justice Brandeis, upheld the Commission in its efforts to prevent the
company from falsely advertising as "gray wool", "natural worsted" and
"Australian wool" underwear which contained but a small percentage of
wool, in some cases as little as ten per cent. He said: "The fact that
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This decision looked like the green light to the Commis-
sion and it acted accordingly. Following the mandate of
the Court it strove to break up deceptive advertising wher-
ever it reared its ugly head, regardless of whether or not it
injured competitors. But ten years later, in the Raladam
case, it ran amok when it tackled Marmola, "a scientific
and safe remedy for obesity", according to the ads. Be-
cause it is the leading case on the authority of the Commis-
sion and caused amendatory legislation in Congress to en-
large the Commission's powers, a brief resum6 of this case
is made.
The Commission contended that the Raladam Com-
pany's advertising of Marmola tablets to reduce weight
was "false, fraudulent and injurious to the public." A
cease and desist order was issued. Upon a petition to re-
view the order in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals it was
held that the Commission had overstepped the bounds and
should limit its activities to matters having a fair relation-
ship to enforcement of general anti-trust and anti-monop-
oly policy. Judge Denison, who wrote the lower court
opinion, made some tart comments on the self-medicating
habits of the American people and took occasion to toss a
few remarks at the personal habits of his colleagues on
the federal bench.36
misrepresentation and misdescription have become so common in the knit
underwear trade that most dealers no longer accept labels at their face
value does not prevent their use being an unfair method of competition. A
method inherently unfair does not cease to be so because those competed
against have become aware of the wrongful practise."
This practise now is controlled by the wool-labeling act of 1940 which
requires all articles containing any wool to be properly labeled. 54 Stat.
1128-33; U. S. C. A., Title 15, Secs. 68-68j (Oct. 14, 1940, effective July 14,
1941).
30 Raladam Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 42 F. (2d) 430 (C. C. A.
6th, 1930). The Court said, at pages 430-434:
"The so-called patent medicine habit has a traditional hold upon
the masses of the American people. The medical profession has
always contended that auto-diagnosis, drug store purchases, and
self-medication are dangerous to the public health, and ought to be
suppressed or minimized.
"... For many years, and particularly of recent years, vast num-
bers of persons have desired to reduce their weight. Whether there
was accumulation of fatty tissue beyond the normal standard for
that person-a real obesity,-or whether there was a mere desire
to be more slender, the tendency went to such an extent as to become
a craze or a fad. Every one knew that a diminution of food intake
-diet-or an increase of muscular effort--exercise-would tend to
bring reduction. These things were prescribed and controlled by
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Applying the theory that only those false advertise-
ments could be banned which injured competitors, the
court dived into Marmola's competitive field and came up
with the finding that these competitors also indulged in
the same lurid advertising and thus were hardly injured,
were on the same "index expurgatorius" as Marmola, and
in fact were as "relatively disreputable". "It cannot be
seriously contended," Judge Denison concludes, "that the
machinery of the Commission was intended to give govern-
mental aid to the protection of this kind of trade and
commerce."
Upon appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the lower
court, and the Commission found itself limited to its orig-
inal purpose of enforcing the Sherman Act, the Clayton
Act and breaking up unfair trade practices which amount
to a destruction of competition. Furthermore, the compe-
tition to be protected must be legitimate competition and
not just another patent medicine. "Certainly", said Mr.
Justice Sutherland, "it is hard to see why Congress would
set itself to the task of devising means and creating ad-
ministrative machinery for the purpose of preserving the
business of one knave from the unfair competition of an-
other."3 7
doctors and institutions, and were promoted by propaganda un-
measured.
". The commission's witnesses believe that this extract should
not be given to a patient until after a metabolism test to make sure
(or rather to make probable) that the patient has a thyroid de-
ficiency rather than an excess. . . . All .this merely comes to saying
that they think the drug store sale of Marmola is unsafe because
they think no active drug or agent should be by the public self-pre-
scribed or self-administered ...
"Very likely every member of this court will personally fully agree
with this professional opinion that such public self-medication is
unwise; and then go out and buy quinine or aspirin, or anything
else that he is told will help his particular ailment."
87 Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam, 283 U. S. 643 (1931). This
decision was duly criticized. See Handler, The Juri8diction of the Federal
Trade Commission Over False Adverti-sing, 31 Col. L. R. 527, 536 (1931).
He said:
"There is no dispute, so far as I am aware, concerning the desira-
bility of forbidding false and misleading advertising. The issue in
the Raladam case was simply whether Congress had already given
the Commission the power to intervene in the interest of the public
where misrepresentation and deception are rife in an entire industry,
or whether any legislation is necessary to accomplish this end. It
will not be denied that some governmental agency should possess
such powers, and that there is none at present better equipped than
the Commission."
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The loophole found in the Commission's practise by the
Supreme Court in the Raladam case was adequately
plugged by the Wheeler-Lea Amendment of 1938,8 already
referred to. Now the Commission may and does tackle
any false, deceptive or misleading advertisement or trade
practise, wherever found, without reference to whether a
competitor is damaged. There is no doubt now as to the
scope of its powers, provided there is an interstate aspect
to the case. Whether it will exercise these great powers
wisely and in the public interest lies in the lap of the
future. Its past record is temperate and constructive. Its
present spokesmen are conciliatory. Its chief examiner
explained in Baltimore in 1941:
"I wish to assure you at this juncture that the Com-
mission, in taking corrective action in cases involving
false and misleading advertising, is not in any sense
attempting to exercise the power of censorship, and
that it emphatically does not desire any such power.
Neither is the Commission arbitrarily attempting to
impose its views or desires on the advertiser, as this
would constitute a bureaucratic interference with
business, repugnant indeed to salutary and free com-
petition, and wholly undesirable alike to the public
and to business." 9
Some of its recent cases involve such questions as the
value of aspirin content in "Aspirub" when applied der-
mally;40 the question whether there was misrepresentation,
or only normal "puffing," in the advertisement of a prostate
gland activating device;4' the reducing value of girth-con-
trol salts ;42 the refurbishment of domestic perfumes with
French labels;4" the passing off of American-made soaps as
Supra, n. 29.
"Address of James A. Horton, chief examiner, Federal Trade Commis-
sion, before Better Business Bureau of Baltimore, Emerson Hotel, Balti-
more, November 10, 1941.
40 Justin Haynes & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 105 F. (2d) 988
(C. C. A. 2nd, 1938).
," Electro-Thermal Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 91 F. (2d) 477 (C.
C. A. 9th, 1937).
" Hughes v. Federal Trade Commission, 77 F. (2d) 886 (C. C. A. 2nd,
1935).
" Fioret Sales Co., Inc., v. Federal Trade Commission, 100 F. (2d) 358
(C. C. A. 2nd, 1938).
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"English Tub"," and the practice of "giving" valuable en-
cyclopedias to prominent men, in exchange for the use of
their names, if only they pay the ten-year service charges
on the books.
4 5
Illustrating how far the Commission's jurisdiction now
extends, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in 1939 upheld
a banning of the words "original" and "exclusively" used
by the Belmont Laboratories in connection with ads for
soap and ointment. It had been claimed for this product,
a concoction known as Mazon, that it afforded quick and
permanent elimination of eczema and that it was the orig-
inal treatment of its kind for a variety of skin diseases, in-
cluding athlete's foot and barber's itch. One ad read: "No
other treatment for permanent cure has ever been discov-
ered. Some of the best known skin specialists in the City
of Philadelphia are using it exclusively and praise it
highly."
Judge William Clark of Trenton, whose opinions are
uniformly colorful, made good use of the material here
afforded. In connection with the use of the word "orig-
inal" he had this to say:
"Here 'original' appears to be used in the two senses
of 'novel' and 'not otherwise obtainable'. Strictly
speaking, therefore, it has no bearing on efficacy and
so no relation to false hopes. But it has, it seems to
us, a harmful connotation appropriate to each sense.
The implication of newness is well recognized. In law
what is old may be good, but in science progress is
prized. One has a vision of thousands of doctors and
druggists working in thousands of hospitals and lab-
oratories and emerging with-Mazon. ' '4
Another recent case from the same circuit concerned
Pep Boys, Inc. This corporation had obtained a trademark
on the name "Remington" to be used upon its particular
44 Federal Trade Commission v. Bradley, 31 F. (2d) 569 (C. C. A. 2nd,
1929).
45 Federal Trade Commission v. Standard Dducation Society, 302 U. S.
112 (1937).
46Belmont Laboratories v. Federal Trade Commisslon, 103 F. (2d) 538,
541 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1939).
[VOL. VII
CAVEAT EMPTOR
brand of radios. The Court upheld the Commission's order
prohibiting the use of this name on radios on the grounds
that the name had a long-established, distinct and special
connotation in the public mind in connection with type-
writers (Remington Rand, Inc.) and ammunition (Reming-
ton Arms). The Court said:
"The test is whether the natural and probable re-
sult of the use by petitioner of the name 'Remington'
makes the average purchaser unwittingly, under ordi-
nary conditions, purchase that which he did not intend
to buy. A deliberate effort to deceive is not necessary
nor must the Commission find actual deception. .... -47
This decision, if followed, may have a far-reaching effect.
The beleaguered advertiser now must not only be truth-
ful; he also must make sure that neither his trade name
nor his ad deceives anyone, even unwittingly.
Before concluding, passing mention might be made of
other federal agencies which check advertising and other
trade practises. One is the Post Office Department whose
postal regulations provide that criminal prosecution may
be brought for using the mails to defraud. There is in the
regulations a requirement of proof of intent to defraud. 8
This has not been a popular statute with the clean adver-
tising group because of the difficulties of proof, the neces-
sity of proceeding in criminal law, and the fact that the
statute seems to emphasize the purity of the mails over the
protection of the consumer.
In the food and drug field, there is an elaborate set-up
for the control of false advertising through the Federal
Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906,"1 together with its more
recent amendments. This is the Act which grew out of
Upton Sinclair's "The Jungle" and which not only regu-
lates the advertising and sale of food and drugs but now,
by an amendment which redefines the simple term "drugs",
regulates a great many other things such as, for example,
"Pep Boys-Manny, Moe and Jack, Inc., v. Federal Trade Commission,
122 F. (2d) 158, 161 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1941).
"Criminal Code: Using mails to promote fraud. 35 Stat. 1130; U. S.
C. A. Title 18, Sec. 338.
" Food and Drugs, 34 Stat. 768; U. S. C. A. Title 21.
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diathermic devices, obesity regulators and the whole lush
and lucrative field known as the cosmetics industry.50
As to the cantankerous subject of alcoholic beverages,
the federal government closely patrols liquor and beer
advertising. During one year, it disapproved 9,000 appli-
cations for label approval, out of the total of more than
90,000 acted upon, or ten per cent. More than 2,800 pro-
posed advertisements were reviewed and many were dis-
approved. Typical of the ads disapproved were these:
"America's Fastest Selling Applejack"; "Drink it tonight
and you will feel like a million tomorrow"; and various
illustrations, such as religious objects, women, children
and athletes, which subjects are termed "socially objection-
able., 51
All this governmental paternalism is a far cry from the
lusty days of the horse-trader when caveat emptor was in
full flower. Today it is not the buyer but the seller who
must watch his step, lest he run afoul of the State adver-
tising statutes or the long, strong arm of the Federal Trade
Commission and the other federal agencies.
That some sort of regulation of advertisers is necessary
in modern times is considered now beyond debate. This
was indicated by the best-seller of a decade ago, the book
called "One Hundred Million Guinea Pigs", 2 which ex-
posed hundreds of deceptive trade practises and rang the
bell of consumer-consciousness throughout the nation. 8
50 The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) ; U. S.
C. A. Title 21, Sec. 301; 6 Law and Contemporary Problems 2.
51 Federal Alcohol Administration, Annual Report to Congress (1940),
pages 7, 13, 16, 17, 18; (1940) 53 H. L. R. 828, 834.
52 Kallet and Schlink, One Hundred Million Guinea Pigs (1932).
53 One law review writer on the subject concludes his article with these
words:
"A marked consumer consciousness characterizes recent federal
activity, both legislative and administrative. But the mere sup-
pression of outright falsehood is not the ultimate solution, unless
it is to be accompanied by a reasonable standard of truth. Con-
fronted with a bewildering variety of products and the skillful advo-
cacy of the advertiser, the modern purchaser needs information for
intelligent buying. . . . Representation of the consumer interest in
the Federal Government is still in a gestational stage. A possible
solution lies in the centralization of control over advertising in one
articulate and independent agency, dedicated to the consumer wel-
fare and serving also as the nucleus for consumer education. Such
an agency might more effectively extirpate the evils of dishonest
advertising by uniting business, government and consumer in a con-
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Today there are well-organized consumer groups, disinter-
ested and energetic, whose purpose is to check and double-
check the many representations made for certain adver-
tised products. Their particular ward and beneficiary is
the housewife, who performs the lion's share of public
buying.
Leading among these unofficial agencies are the Better
Business Bureaus found in nearly every large city, which
are maintained and financed by local business interests-a
sort of self-regulation and self-policing of the trade. They
are doing under great difficulty a work of increasing im-
portance.
What effect will war-time economies have upon this
question?
In all lines of trade, the problem of the merchant today
is not to sell his goods but to get the goods to sell. There
is little incentive for the vendor to overstate his case or
even to advertise at all, except to keep his trade name
before the public. Thus far there has been little diminu-
tion in advertising copy but the immediate future of ad-
vertising is, to say the least, uncertain.
This writer ventures the opinion, however, that the
work of advertising's policemen, both official and unofficial,
will be even more important during the war years than
heretofore. Merchants cut off from their "leaders" by war
products priorities must of necessity turn to other lines.
They must sell the public, accustomed to the best, a rather
poor substitute; or they must sell the public something en-
tirely different from what it wants or has been used to.
If radios are unavailable, how about phonograph records,
for instance? And if refrigerators are "frozen" how about
the old-fashioned ice box?
This task of diverting the consumer into the purchase
and use of ersatz materials and substitute products will
call for all the ingenuity that the advertising profession
certed drive for the protection of the welfare of 130,000,000 persons
weary of being guinea pigs." (1940) 53 Harv. L. R. 828, 841-2.
For other articles, see National Government and False Advertising (1933)
19 Iowa L. R. 28; Consumer's Protection Under the Federal Pure Food and
Drugs Act (1932) 32 Col. L. R. 720; and notes in (1933) 31 Mich. L. R. 804;
(1936) 22 Va. L. R. 812; (1939) 39 Col. L. R. 259.
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can muster. Naturally, there will be some exaggeration,
misstatement and deception, new in character because de-
scriptive of a new or hitherto unadvertised product.
The task of the policing agencies, therefore, not only
will continue unabated but will be fraught with many new
and perplexing problems. Eternal vigilance not only is
the price of freedom but also is the price of maintaining
fair trade practices in the difficult years of adjustment just
ahead. The advertiser must be on his toes no less tomor-
row than today or yesterday. For the policy of these, our
modern times, expressed in custom and fortified in statute,
is "Let the seller beware".
